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A PROPOSAL FOR CHANGING THE
JURISDICTIONAL PROVISIONS
OF THE NEW FEDERAL
CRIMINAL CODE
John F. Dobbynt
On January 7, 1971, the National Commission on Reform of Fed-
eral Criminal Laws transmitted to the President and Congress its
proposal' for the complete revision of the substantive federal criminal
law.2 The work was begun under a congressional mandate to improve
a body of law that had been the result of patchwork, stopgap legisla-
tion.3 For example, one of the more mechanical improvements pro-
posed by the Commission was to gather under Title 18 practically all
enactments dealing with federal criminal law. The Commission, how-
ever, did not limit itself to such neutral, uncontroversial changes. It
took its mandate to reform and improve literally,4 and as always, the
more radical the reform, the greater the fury of the resulting contro-
versy. This article deals with the most far-reaching and, therefore, the
most hotly debated area of reform-the new approach to federal juris-
diction over criminal conduct.
Under the current system, federal crimes are defined in terms of
the element that gives the federal government the right to control the
conduct-the so-called jurisdictional element. For example, the Dyer
Act5 made it a criminal offense knowingly to transport a stolen auto-
t Associate Professor of Law, Villanova University. A.B. 1959, LL.M. 1969, Harvard
University; J.D. 1965, Boston College.
1 NATIONAL COMMi'N ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, FINAL REPORT: A PRO-
POSED NEW FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE (1971) [hereinafter dted as PRoPosED CODE].
2 18 U.S.C. §§ 1-6005 (1970).
3 The Commission was created by Congress in 1966 to review the federal system of
criminal justice. Act of Nov. 8, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-801, 80 Stat. 1516, as amended, Act of
July 8, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-59, 83 Stat. 44.
4 The Commission was granted authority to recommend sweeping changes in the
criminal laws of the United States:
The Commission shall make a full and complete review and study of the statutory
and case law of the United States which constitutes the federal system of criminal
justice for the purpose of formulating and recommending to the Congress legisla-
tion which would improve the federal system of criminal justice. It shall be the
further duty of the Commission to make recommendations for revision and recodi-
fication of the criminal laws of the United States, including the repeal of un-
necessary or undesirable statutes and such changes in the penalty structure as the
Commission may feel will better serve the ends of justice.
Act of Nov. 8, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-801, § 3, 80 Stat. 1516-17.
5 18 U.S.C. § 2312 (1970). The purpose of the Dyer Act was to combat the increas-
FEDERAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION 199
mobile or airplane across a state line. The wording of the Act makes
it appear that the crux of the criminal offense lies not in the theft of
the car, but rather in the relatively neutral action of crossing the state
line.
In addition to the philosophic discomfort caused by this type of
off-center focusing, some very practical difficulties arise. First, the maxi-
mum penalties fixed for federal crimes are often keyed to the obtuse
definition of the crime. For example, federal authorities have at times
been limited to a prosecution for the crime obliquely defined as con-
spiracy to interfere with civil rights," or intimidation of a federal wit-
ness7 (crimes with relatively low maximum penalties), when the actual
offense was a serious assaults or even murder.
Another common difficulty that arises out of defining federal
crimes in jurisdictional terms is the problem of extradition from another
nation. Extradition treaties often condition the transfer of prisoners
on the requirement that the activity for which the prisoner is to be
tried be a crime in the extraditing nation as well.9 In many cases extra-
dition is impossible because no crime similar to the uniquely worded
federal offense exists in the other nation.' 0
A third problem involves the possible multiplication of counts
for what is essentially one crime. If, for example, the criminal activity
is a single fraud scheme, and the only federal statute under which it
can be prosecuted defines the crime as use of the mails in perpetrating
a fraud, the indictment can and often does contain as many counts as
there are individual letters mailed."
The proposed new Title 18 strikes directly at these problems. The
solution offered by the Commission is to redefine criminal conduct in
terms nearly identical to those used in state statutes. The crimes of
murder, theft, and prostitution are defined directly,12 with no express
mention of crossing state lines, or of using the telephone or mail,
or of any other traditional federal jurisdictional element. One separate
ingly successful operations of criminal syndicates organized to steal a car in one state and
sell it in another. The interstate aspects of the business had put it effectively beyond the
reach of the authorities of either state.
6 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1970).
7 18 id. § 1505.
8 See, e.g., Ferina v. United States, 340 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1965).
9 See, e.g., Treaty of Extradition with France, Jan. 6, 1909, 37 Stat. 1526, T.S. No.
561; Treaty of Extradition with Spain, June 15, 1904, 35 Stat. 1947, T.S. No. 492 (effective
May 21, 1908).
1o See, e.g., In re Lamar, [1940] 2 W.W.R. 471, 477 (Alta. 1940).
1 See, e.g., Wood v. United States, 279 F.2d 359 (8th Cir. 1960); Becker v. United
States, 91 F.2d 550 (9th Cir. 1937).
12 PROPOSED CODE §§ 1601, 1731-41, 1841-49.
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section of the code (section 201)13 catalogues all of the familiar federal
jurisdictional bases, such as "the offense affects interstate or foreign
commerce,"' 4 or "movement of any person across a state or United
States boundary occurs in the commission or consummation of the
offense."' 5 Each of the simple substantive crimes is then keyed to this
cataloguing section by providing that "federal jurisdiction over an
offense defined in this section" shall exist under specific paragraphs of
section 201.
This reorientation in definition of federal crimes is a deceptively
simple solution to the problems enumerated above. Dwelling on those
13 Section 201. Common Jurisdictional Bases.
Federal jurisdiction to penalize an offense under this Code exists under the
circumstances which are set forth as the jurisdictional base or bases for that
offense.
Bases commonly used in this Code are as follows:
(a) the offense is committed within the special maritime and territorial juris-
diction of the United States as defined in section 210;
(b) the offense is committed in the course of committing or in immediate
flight from the commission of any other offense defined in this Code over
which federal jurisdiction exists;
(c) the victim is a federal public servant engaged in the performance of his
official duties or is the President of the United States, the President-elect,
the Vice President, or, if there is no Vice President, the officer next in the
order of succession to the office of President of the United States, the Vice
President-elect, or any individual who is acting as President under the
Constitution and laws of the United States, a candidate for President or
Vice President, or any member or member-designate of the President's
cabinet, or a member of Congress, or a federal judge, or a head of a
foreign nation or a foreign minister, ambassador or other public minister;
(d) the property which is the subject of the offense is owned by or in the
custody or control of the United States or is being manufactured, con-
structed or stored for the United States;
(e) the United States mails or a facility in interstate or foreign commerce is
used in the commission or consummation of the offense;
(f) the offense is against a transportation, communication, or power facility
of interstate or foreign commerce or against a United States mal facility;
(g) the offense affects interstate or foreign commerce;
(h) movement of any person across a state or United States boundary occurs
in the commission or consummation of the offense;
(i) the property which is the subject of the offense is moving in interstate or
foreign commerce or constitutes or is part of an interstate or foreign ship-
ment;
(j) the property which is the subject of the offense is moved across a state or
United States boundary in the commission or consummation of the offense;
(k) the property which is the subject of the offense is owned by or in the
custody of a national credit institution;
(1) the offense is committed under circumstances amounting to piracy, as
prescribed in section 212.
When no base is specified for an offense, federal jurisdiction exists if the offense
is committed anywhere within the United States, or within the special maritime
and territorial jurisdiction of the United States.
PROPOSED CODE § 201.
14 Id. § 201(g).
15 Id. § 201(h).
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problems can easily obscure the original purpose and salutary effect
of defining crimes in federal jurisdictional terms. Throughout the
evolution of constitutional concepts, the theory of federalism has re-
tained some degree of life. The original idea of the framers of the
Constitution, implicit in the specificity of the cautiously enumerated
areas of federal authority, and capped tightly by the tenth amendment,
has unquestionably undergone an evolution in favor of broader, less
strictly defined federal power. Modem problems have increasingly de-
manded national solutions. Yet the original spirit remains alive.' 6
While sections of the Constitution can be stretched to justify federal
control over nearly every phase of human conduct, the spirit of the
document still demands that there be a true need for federal action-
a true federal interest-before the federal government may legitimately
act. Although we have moved beyond the day when, for example, fed-
eral intervention was checked by a narrow reading of the words of the
commerce clause, we have by no means arrived at the legitimization
of federal activity under that clause in areas of pure state concern
where no substantial federal interest can be shown. There is a serious
danger in a federal criminal code that invites one to forget the reason
that federal crimes were originally defined in jurisdictional terms.
This article is not a plea for rejection of the Commission's new
approach to a federal criminal code. The proposal represents an enor-
mous step forward in logic and consistency. It is rather a plea that
effective safeguards be built into the new code.
I
SAFEGUARDS
Under the proposed code there is very little criminal activity that
could not be shoehorned into federal court on one or more of the
broad jurisdictional bases of section 201 if an overzealous federal prose-
cutor put his imagination to work.'7 For example, the new jurisdictional
16 Professor Henry Hart wrote in 1954 that "[c]onstitutional impediments to central-
ized direction, in those matters in which there is no compelling need for national action,
appear as safeguards against impairments of the viability of the social mechanism as a
whole." Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 489, 490-
91 (1954).
17 The danger of competition between state and federal authorities for power is
greatest in the sections of the PRoPosED CODE covering homicide (§ 1601), assault (§§ 1611-
19), sex offenses (§§ 1641-50), arson (§ 1701), burglary (§ 1711), robbery (§ 1721), theft
(§§ 1731-41), counterfeiting and forgery (§ 1751-55), rigging sporting events (§ 1757),
indting riot (§ 1801), arming rioters (§ 1802), supplying firearms (§ 1811), gambling
(§ 1831), and prostitution (§§ 1841-43).
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basis introduced in section 201(b) would greatly enlarge the possible
scope of federal action. This is so-called "piggy-back jurisdiction,"
applicable when "the offense is committed in the course of committing
or in immediate flight from the commission of any other offense defined
in this Code over which federal jurisdiction exists." 18 There are few
guidelines indicating how broadly or narrowly the words "in the course
of" are to be interpreted. Section 207(c) makes a passing nod at the prob-
lem by adding the vague limitation that the section 201(b) offense
ought to be "closely related" to the underlying offense.
The decision to take federal control over a specific case of robbery,
for example, will involve two very difficult and sensitive questions.
First, is there a sufficient and genuine federal interest in the matter to
make federal control constitutional? Second, aside from raw constitu-
tional power, is it a wise policy decision to remove the matter from
state hands, in view of the need to maximize cooperation and minimize
unnecessary friction between state and federal governments?19
The system proposed by the Commission contains a serious, but
correctable flaw. Full discretion for deciding where to draw the line on
federal control over criminal conduct is placed in the local federal prose-
cutor, the United States Attorney in each district.20 Complete power to
decide whethe4 prosecution of a given case is (1) constitutionally per-
missible, and (2) in the best interests of federal-state relations, reposes
in each of these numerous federal agents. The exercise of discretion is
vested with finality by section 207, which states that "[t]he presence or
absence of a federal interest and any other question relating to the
exercise of the discretion referred to in this section are for the prosecut-
ing authorities alone and are not litigable."21 The door is finally bolted
18 PROPOSED CODE § 201(b).
19 It takes little imagination to grasp the practical need for considered and consistent
judgment if the delicate system of federalism is to work in this area. Jealousy of authority
between federal and state authorities is a fact of life and needs no encouragement from
ill-considered or overeager injections of federal control into matters over which state
agencies justifiably claim sovereignty. There is the further danger that if decisions in
individual cases are made without some apparent consistency, confusion will reign as to
which sovereign is to take responsibility for investigating and prosecuting a particular
activity. Even without a breakdown in state-federal cooperation, the resultant confusion
could leave serious gaps in enforcement by either authority.
20 PRoPosED CODE § 207.
21 There is more than a mere possibility that the "not litigable" clause could turn
out to be wishful thinking. Any attack by a state on an excessive exercise of federal juris-
diction could be couched in terms of a constitutional claim under the tenth amendment.
An individual defendant would probably raise the issue by attacking the constitutional
validity of the indictment or information. Any act of Congress purporting to deny any
possible forum to either of these constitutional claims-thereby making the local United
[Vol. 57:198
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shut to state authorities by section 708 which bars in most instances state
prosecution "based on the same conduct or [arising] from the same
criminal episode" 22 after federal prosecution. In short, once the federal
prosecutor decides to step in, the state authorities are, in effect, out of
the ball game. This problem is further exacerbated by the fact that the
federal court will apply federal rules covering insanity,23 justification,24
self-defense,25 defense of others, 26 excuse,2 7 mistake of law,28 duress,29
and other issues. Such applications could easily result in a pattern of
contradictory verdicts, depending on whether the case is tried in a fed-
eral or state court.
The system has two basic deficiencies: (1) lack of workable, under-
standable guidelines to aid the federal prosecutor in deciding whether
a particular case involves the requisite federal interest; and (2) lack of
any check on the local federal prosecutor's exercise of the broad discre-
tion entrusted to him. The importance of understandable guidelines and
checks cannot be overstated.30 It is the duty of Congress, as far as prac-
ticable, to fix the outer boundaries of legitimate federal prosecutorial
authority by laying down guidelines that can intelligently be applied
to specific fact situations,3 1 and then to establish a procedure that will
give some realistic assurance that the standards will be observed.
These requirements can be met within the framework of the Com-
States Attorney the final, unchallengeable arbiter of federal constitutional power-would
undoubtedly fail its first test of constitutionality.
The plan proposed herein (text accompanying note 41 infra) would provide a practical
and efficient forum for the claims of the state and could, therefore, be made the exclusive
forum for these claims. The defendant, despite any congressional attempt at nonlitigability,
will probably be held ultimately to retain his adequate remedy by way of challenge to the
indictment or information in the federal prosecution itself. In this way, the constitution-
ality of the overall proposed code would remain intact.
22 PROpOsED CODE § 708.
23 Id. § 503.
24 Id. § 601.
25 Id. § 603.
26 Id. § 604.
27 Id. § 608.
28 Id. § 609.
29 Id. § 610.
30 Again in the words of Professor Hart: "Federal intervention has been thought of
as requiring special justification, and the decision that such justification has been shown,
being essentially discretionary, has belonged in most cases to Congress." Hart, supra note
16, at 497 (footnote omitted).
31 The report of the American Law Institute on clarification of the division of federal
and state jurisdiction generally, drafted in response to the request of Chief Justice Warren,
lists the following four criteria for rules or standards in this area. They must be (1)
rational; (2) clear; (3) consistent with efficient judicial administration; and (4) designed to
reduce friction between the two systems. See Wright, Restructuring Federal Jurisdiction:
The American Law Institute Proposals, 26 WAsH. - L.E L. Rxv. 185, 186-87 (1969).
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mission's proposed code. Consider first the question of guidelines. The
answer offered by the Commission in section 207 is totally inadequate.3 2
The opening sentence keynotes the section's weakness and lack of fair
restraint on federal prosecutors:
Notwithstanding the existence of concurrent jurisdiction, fed-
eral law enforcement agencies are authorized to decline or discon-
tinue federal enforcement efforts whenever the offense can effec-
tively be prosecuted by nonfederal agencies and it appears that
there is no substantial federal interest in further prosecution or
that the offense primarily affects state, local or foreign interests.83
Words that will certainly be scrutinized and interpreted by every
individual United States Attorney in an effort to determine the scope
of his delegated power should be scrupulously chosen. First, the words
"are authorized" should be replaced by the words "are directed." In
this way, local federal prosecutors will be made aware of their duty to
refrain from injecting federal power into situations where it is not con-
stitutionally permissible.
The second proposed change, although perhaps a technical syllogis-
tic matter, is important since every word and phrase of section 207 will
undoubtedly undergo scrupulous interpretation by competing authori-
ties. The language quoted above apparently "authorizes" federal prose-
cutors to cease prosecution only if two conditions are present:
32 § 207. Discretionary Restraint in Exercise of Concurrent Jurisdiction.
Notwithstanding the existence of concurrent jurisdiction, federal law enforcement
agencies are authorized to decline or discontinue federal enforcement efforts when-
ever the offense can effectively be prosecuted by nonfederal agencies and it appears
that there is no substantial Federal interest in further prosecution or that the
offense primarily affects state, local or foreign interests. A substantial federal
interest exists in the following circumstances, among others:
(a) the offense is serious and state or local law enforcement is impeded by
interstate aspects of the case; (b) federal enforcement is believed to be neces-
sary to vindicate federally-protected civil rights; (c) if federal jurisdiction
exists under section 201(b), the offense is closely related to the underlying
offense, as to which there is a substantial federal interest; (d) an offense ap-
parently limited in its impact is believed to be associated with organized
criminal activities extending beyond state lines; (e) state or local law enforce-
ment has been so corrupted as to undermine its effectiveness substantially.
Where federal law enforcement efforts are discontinued in deference to state, lo-
cal or foreign prosecution, federal agencies are directed to cooperate with state,
local or foreign agencies, by providing them with evidence already gathered or
otherwise, to the extent that this is practicable without prejudice to federal law
enforcement. The Attorney General is authorized to promulgate additional guide-
lines for the exercise of discretion in employing federal criminal jurisdiction. The
presence or absence of a federal interest and any other question relating to the
exercise of the discretion referred to in this section are for the prosecuting authori-
ties alone and are not litigable.
PaorosED CODE § 207.
33 Id. (emphasis added).
[Vol. 57:198
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(1) the offense can be effectively prosecuted by nonfederal agen-
des; and
(2) there is no substantial federal interest in prosecution, or the
offense primarily affects state interests.
This could logically be interpreted to mean that even if there were no
federal interest in the matter, unless in the judgment of the local federal
prosecutor nonfederal agencies could "effectively" conduct the prose-
cution, the federal agent is not even "authorized" to refrain from
handling the matter. This casts the federal agent in the unsuitable role
of "Big Brother," looking over the shoulder of his state counterpart
engaged in purely state affairs, and distorts any concept of federalism.
This deficiency in language could be corrected by the following word-
ing of the opening sentence of section 207:
Notwithstanding the existence of concurrent jurisdiction, fed-
eral law enforcement agencies are directed to decline or discon-
tinue federal enforcement efforts whenever it appears that there
is no substantial federal interest in further prosecution or that the
offense primarily affects state, local, or foreign interests.
The second sentence of section 207 makes an inadequate and mis-
directed attempt to fix guidelines for deciding when a "substantial fed-
eral interest" exists. Such an interest exists when
(a) the offense is serious and state or local law enforcement is
impeded by interstate aspects of the case .... 84
The difficulty in finding concrete guidance in this phrase arises because
the undefined word "impeded" could mean anything from impossible
to merely inconvenient. The permissive, weak spirit of the section in-
vites the latter interpretation. The phrase should be tightened to leave
less room for "interpretation" by an overzealous prosecutor. It might,
for example, read:
(a) the offense is serious and state or local authorities are unable
to enforce state or local law because of the interstate aspects
of the case ....
Only in such a situation should a matter of primary state concern be
transformed into a matter of federal interest.
A "substantial federal interest" also exists when
(b) federal enforcement is believed to be necessary to vindicate
federally-protected civil rights .... 35
This loose phraseology creates the illusion of standards without provid-
84 Id. § 207(a) (emphasis added).
85 Id. § 207(b) (emphasis added).
1972]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
ing them. The boundary of legitimate federal jurisdiction should turn
on objective criteria, not on an individual prosecutor's belief. Secondly,
the phrase "is believed to be " raises more questions than it answers.
What degree of belief is required (beyond a reasonable doubt or mere
suspicion)? On what type of evidentiary substantiation must it be based
(no evidence at all, or objective showing of probable cause)? These
problems can be eliminated and a comprehensible standard established
by merely eliminating the words "believed to be" so that the clause
would read:
(b) federal enforcement is necessary to vindicate federally-pro-
tected civil rights ....
The third instance in which a "substantial federal interest" exists is
as follows:
(c) if federal jurisdiction exists under section 201(b), the offense
is closely related to the underlying offense, as to which there
is a substantial federal interest .... 36
This subsection refers to the new "piggy-back jurisdiction" introduced
by section 201 (b). Its loose terminology could easily turn the experi-
mental section 201 (b) into a dangerous Pandora's box. "Piggy-back
jurisdiction" is a shoehorn to ease any criminal activity into federal
courts as long as it "is committed in the course of committing or in
immediate flight from the commission of any other offense defined in
this Code over which federal jurisdiction exists."37 This phrasing could
cover any activity of pure, unquestioned state concern which coincides
in time, place, or victim with a federal offense. Certainly such a coinci-
dence is not enough to create a true federal interest so as to take the
matter out of the hands of state authorities. The words "closely related"
merely define the degree of coincidence required, not the type or char-
acter of connection between the two crimes. Section 207 (c) might be
reworded to define the type of connection in these terms:
(c) if federal jurisdiction exists under section 201(b), the offense
is an integral part of, or necessary to the accomplishment of
the underlying offense, as to which there is a substantial federal
interest ....
The fourth instance of a federal interest is when
(d) an offense apparently limited in its impact is believed to be
associated with organized criminal activities extending be-
yond state lines . ... 8
38 Id. § 207(c) (emphasis added).
37 Id. § 201(b).
38 Id. § 207(d) (emphasis added).
[Vol. 57:198
FEDERAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
The words "believed to be" give rise to all of the uncertainties and po-
tential for abuse, deliberate or otherwise, as did those of subsection (b)
of section 207.11 The solution again is to delete the words "believed
to be":
(d) an offense apparently limited in its impact is associated with
organized criminal activities extending beyond state lines.
It is the connection with organized crime, not someone's mere belief in
it, that gives rise to legitimate federal jurisdiction.
The last instance in section 207 in which a federal interest exists is
when
(e) state or local law enforcement has been so corrupted as to
undermine its effectiveness substantially.40
This subsection is particularly troublesome. It establishes the federal
prosecutor as watchdog over state authorities engaged in the conduct of
state criminal prosecutions, and short-circuits the properly established
political, as well as legal, procedures for dealing with corruption in state
government. Also, since it is an unfortunate fact of life that corruption
in government, federal or local, is more often a question of degree than
of existence, this subsection delegates the authority to each local federal
prosecutor to make the highly sensitive decision as to when the degree
of state corruption has exceeded some elusive line so as to "legitimize"
federal interference. In addition, any activity that truly affects a federal
interest can be reached under one of the other definitions of federal
interest. This subsection serves no necessary purpose and carries the
seeds of dangerous misuse. It places in the hands of the local federal
prosecutor the power to generate unnecessary and unwarranted friction
between state and federal governments through overeager or ambitious
exercise of his unrestrained discretion. This subsection should be de-
leted in its entirety from section 207.
II
ENFORCEMENT
Defining the outer boundaries of federal interest and directing the
federal prosecutor to remain within them is one thing; creating a work-
able system to see that this is in fact done is quite another. For this
reason, section 207 should be expanded to include the following re-
39 See text accompanying note 35 supra.
40 PROPOSED CODE § 207(e).
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quirement: when the local federal prosecutor decides that federal pros-
ecution should be instituted with respect to any of the federal crimes41
presenting particular danger of overlap between state and federal con-
cerns, he should be required to obtain from a federal magistrate in his
district authorization to commence prosecution. He should bear the
burden of establishing that the particular criminal conduct sufficiently
affects a federal interest to warrant federal prosecution. Notice of the
magistrate's hearing and an opportunity to be heard should be given to
the attorney general of the state in which the federal prosecution is to
take place.
There are two possibilities as to the appealability of the magistrate's
decision. The first, favoring a speedy trial and early finality of this ini-
tial question, would be to make the magistrate's decision final and un-
appealable. The second would be to allow either the state attorney
general or the federal prosecutor to appeal the decision to the federal
district court. This alternative favors a more considered decision in
those relatively few instances in which the constitutional or policy de-
cision is of major significance. Because the purpose of this provision is
to protect a healthy working balance between state and federal govern-
ments, there is no need to make the defendant a party to the hearing.
The process of determining state or federal jurisdiction, however, should
be sufficiently expeditious so that the defendant is not unduly ham-
pered in preparing his defense.
This procedure2 would provide the necessary check on the discretion
of the federal prosecutor and draw on the wisdom of the federal judi-
ciary in hammering out consistent interpretations of the guidelines de-
fining "federal interest." It would also provide the means for building
a body of case law in this area through the federal judiciary. The two
major benefits of this would be (1) hopefully, consistency among the
numerous federal districts on the critical question of the range of fed-
eral jurisdiction; and (2) a body of recorded precedent to aid state au-
thorities in predicting what areas of criminal activity will be assumed
under federal control and what areas remain under state responsibility.
State contests of federal jurisdiction would undoubtedly be limited
41 See note 17 and accompanying text supra.
42 This is not a new approach. The framers of the Constitution foresaw the serious
danger of violations of the right to be free from unlawful searches and seizures by over-
zealous enforcement officials. To protect private rights they required a probable cause
hearing in the presence of an impartial magistrate before a warrant to search could be
issued. The same type of probable cause hearing is required for an arrest warrant, and
on the same reasoning. It seems only consistent to require an impartial magistrate to pass
on the factors underlying important decisions affecting the constitutional rights of states.
[Vol. 57:198
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to those few situations in which it would be advisable to have the most
considered and authoritative decision on the question. The mistake of
an overzealous prosecutor in such a case could have far-reaching effects
on state-federal relations. This procedure-would not, of course, in any
way affect the federal prosecutor's right to bring direct criminal action
under any of the numerous clearly federal crimes.
Conclusion
To ensure the continuing viability and salutary effect of the concept
of federalism in federal criminal prosecutions, section 207 of the pro-
posed Federal Criminal Code should be amended to provide necessary
restraints on the federal prosecutor's exercise of discretion, and to estab-
lish a procedure to enforce those restraints effectively.
APPENDIX
Section 207 should be amended to read as follows:
§ 207. RESTRAINT IN EXERCISE OF CONCURRENT JURIsDICTIoN
Notwithstanding the existence of concurrent jurisdiction, federal
law enforcement agencies are directed to decline or discontinue federal
enforcement efforts whenever it appears that there is no substantial
federal interest in further prosecution or that the offense primarily
affects state, local, or foreign interests. A substantial federal interest
exists in the following circumstances, among others:
(a) the offense is serious and state or local authorities are unable to
enforce state or local law because of the interstate aspects of the
case;
(b) federal enforcement is necessary to vindicate federally-protected
civil rights;
(c) if federal jurisdiction exists under section 201(b), the offense is an
integral part of, or necessary to the accomplishment of the under-
lying offense, as to which there is a substantial federal interest;
(d) an offense apparently limited in its impact is associated with or-
ganized criminal activities extending beyond state lines.
Before the federal law enforcement agency shall commence prose-
cution for homicide (§ 1601), assault (§§ 1611-19), sex offenses (§§ 1641-
50), arson (§ 1701), burglary (§ 1711), robbery (§ 1721), theft (§§ 1731-
41), counterfeiting or forging (§§ 1751-55), rigging sporting events
(§ 1757), inciting riot (§ 1801), arming rioters (§ 1802), supplying fire-
arms (§ 1811), gambling (§ 1831), or prostitution (§§ 1841-43), under
jurisdictional bases 201(b), (e), (f), (g), (h), (i), or (j), authorization to
prosecute shall be obtained from a federal magistrate sitting in the dis-
trict in which the prosecution is to take place. Authorization by the
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magistrate shall be granted upon a showing of probable cause to be-
lieve that there exists a sufficient basis for proper federal jurisdiction
and a substantial federal interest in the prosecution. Notice of the
hearing before the magistrate and an opportunity to be heard shall be
given to the attorney general of the state in which prosecution is to take
place. The decision of the magistrate shall be [final and unappealable]
[appealable by either the federal law enforcement agency or the state
attorney general to the federal district court in which prosecution is to
take place].
Where federal law enforcement efforts are discontinued, federal
agencies are directed to cooperate with state, local, or foreign agencies,
by providing them with evidence already gathered or otherwise, to the
extent that this is practicable without prejudice to federal law en-
forcement. The Attorney General is authorized to promulgate addi-
tional guidelines for the exercise of discretion in employing federal
criminal jurisdiction.
